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OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW
Stuart C. Hollimon*
Robert E. Vinson, Jr.**
I. ISSUES INVOLVING CONVEYANCING
A. FRACTIONAL ROYALTY INTEREST
HE court of appeals in White v. White1 construed an unambiguous
1955 royalty deed and determined that the deed conveyed a royalty
interest equal to 3/8ths of 1/7th of all the oil, gas, and minerals pro-
duced from a certain tract rather than 3/8ths of 1/7th of the royalty pro-
vided for under an applicable oil, gas, and mineral lease covering the tract.
The royalty deed at issue was made by Modesto White, Sr. to Alice Car-
rington for a term of years, with the remainder to Modesto White, Jr.2 In
this action, Modesto White, Jr. sought a declaration that the royalty deed
* B.A., St. Olaf College; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Stras-
burger & Price, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S., Texas Tech University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law,
Strasburger & Price, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 830 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
2. The portions of the deed relevant to the court's analysis provided:
I, Modesto White [Sr.] ... have granted ... unto Alice Carrington ... for the
period ending January 1, 1962, and thereafter to Modesto [White, Jr.] ... in fee
simple forever, the following described property located in Chambers County,
Texas to wit:
A non-participating mineral royalty equal to three-eighths (3/8ths) of all the oil
and gas and other minerals that may be on or under and produced and saved
from the lands and interests in lands in Chambers County, Texas, owned by the
said Daisy M. Gill, Deceased, at the time of her death, said three-eighths
(3/8ths) royalty interest hereby conveyed being all of the remaining interest now
owned by the undersigned grantor. The mineral royalty interest in the Estate of
Daisy M. Gill shall, after the date of this conveyance, be owned three-eighths
(3/8ths) by Clifford White, one-eighth (1/8) by W.P. Hamblen, one-eighth (1/8)
by Jas. F. Bobbitt, and three-eighths (3/8ths) by the grantees herein [Alice Car-
rington and Modesto White, Jr.], as herein provided.
No part of the lands or the royalty interests or the other mineral interests owned
by the undersigned, MODESTO WHITE, in his own right, are conveyed
hereby, it being the intention of the undersigned to convey hereby only said royalty
interest in the Estate of Daisy M. Gill, Deceased.
This conveyance does not cover any part of, or interest in, the surface of the
lands or any other property acquired from the said Estate of Daisy M. Gill,
Deceased, and this conveyance covering only a non-participating royalty interest,
the said grantees herein shall not be entitled to any bonuses or delay rentals to be
paid on future and existing oil, gas and mineral leases, which are reserved by the
grantor herein, and the grantees herein shall not be required to sign any future
lease or leases.
Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added by court) (footnotes omitted) (first alteration in original). At
the time of her death, Daisy M. Gill owned an undivided one-seventh mineral interest in the
property. That interest was subsequently leased under an instrument which provided for a
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conveyed 3/8ths of 1/7th royalty interest; the successors of Clifford White's
interest, on the other hand, asserted that the deed conveyed 3/8ths of 1/7th
of the royalty provided for under the current lease (or any future valid lease)
executed by the holders of the relevant executive rights. Following a bench
trial on stipulated facts, the trial court determined that the deed conveyed a
fractional royalty interest rather than a fraction of the royalty provided for
under the lease, finding that the deed conveyed a 3/8ths of 1/7th royalty
interest, such being "3/56 of all oil, gas and other minerals produced and
sold" from the premises.3 The court of appeals affirmed. 4
Applying basic rules of deed construction, the court ascertained the intent
of the parties to the deed by considering the express provisions within the
four comers of the instrument and harmonizing all parts of the deed to the
extent possible. 5 In doing this, the court emphasized that the intention of
the grantor was expressed in the deed where it stated that the grantor
"desires to convey a non-participating mineral royalty equal to three-eighths
(3/8ths) of all the oil, gas and other minerals that may be on or under and
produced and saved from the lands and interests in lands owned by the Es-
tate of Daisy Gill, Deceased, in Chambers County, Texas .... -"6 According
to the court, this language made it clear that the grantor intended to convey
a definite fraction (3/8ths of 1/7th) of all the production from the tract and
not merely a fraction of whatever royalty might be provided for under an
unidentified oil and gas lease.7
B. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY CONVEYED
In Robbins v. Amoco Production Co. 8 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, following its decision in Clark v. Amoco Production Co.,9 rejected
another attempt by purported heirs of James Meaders to share in the pro-
duction from the famed Spindletop Field. 10 This case arose out of a 1911
deed from Ephraim Garonzik to James Meaders, which conveyed an undi-
vided one-eighth mineral interest in four specifically described tracts: Ab-
stract Numbers 166, 181, 182, and 183 in Jefferson County. The deed
provided that the four tracts constituted all the property that certain individ-
uals inherited from William McFadden and that the grant was intended to
apply to all properties in Jefferson County that the named individuals were
entitled to inherit from William McFadden.II Apparently, William McFad-
fractional royalty to be paid on all production obtained from the lease premises. See id. at 768
n.2.
3. Id. at 769.
4. Id. at 771.
5. Id. at 769-70.
6. Id. at 770.
7. Id.
8. 952 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1992).
9. 908 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1990).
10. "The Spindletop Oil Field has been a leading source of oil production since 1901. The
discovery of the 'Lucas Gusher' at Spindletop began the East Texas oil boom. Uncounted
billions of dollars worth of oil have since been produced in the Spindletop field." Clark v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 969 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986).
11. The deed stated:
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den's estate owned thirty-seven tracts of land in Jefferson County in addition
to the four tracts specifically described in the 1911 deed. Jewell Robbins
claimed to be an heir of James Meaders and to represent approximately 200
other heirs. She asserted that the 1911 deed conveyed to James Meaders an
undivided one-eighth mineral interest in all forty-one tracts. Robbins
brought suit against Amoco Production Company, Mobil Oil Corporation,
Phillips Petroleum Company, Sun Company, Sun Exploration and Produc-
tion Company ("Sun E&P"), Chevron Company, U.S.A., Shell Oil Com-
pany, and Texaco, Inc., claiming that these oil companies failed to
compensate the Meaders heirs $20 billion for oil and gas produced from
these tracts.
The district court severed Robbins' claims against Chevron and entered
summary judgment in favor of the other defendants.1 2 The court held that
the 1911 deed conveyed an interest in only the four specifically described
tracts and that Robbins failed to prove complete chain of title to three of the
four tracts. 13 Robbins appealed.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's interpretation of the 1911
deed and determined that its prior decision in the Clark case was dispositive
of Robbins' interest.1 4 In Clark other alleged heirs of James Meaders as-
serted the same construction of the same deed. The Fifth Circuit in that case
held that the 1911 deed was not ambiguous and that it conveyed an interest
in the four referenced tracts only. '5 The court in the present case noted that
it had no reason to conclude that such decision was erroneous' 6 and held
that the Clark decision was determinative of Robbins' deed construction
argument. 17
The court then reviewed that part of the summary judgment holding that
Robbins failed to establish sufficient chain of title to tracts 181, 182, and
[T]he above described property herein conveyed is all the property that... J.H.
McFadden, R.D. McFadden, and A.J. McFadden inherited through their
ancester [sic], Wm. McFadden, and this deed is intended to convey to the said
James Meaders one-eights [sic] interest in and to all properties ... that the said
J.H. McFadden, A.J. McFadden, and R.D. McFadden are entitled to by inheri-
tance through their ancestor, the said Wm. McFadden, of every description
whatsoever, situated in the said County of Jefferson.
952 F.2d at 903 (alterations in original).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 904-05.
15. Clark, 908 F.2d at 32. The Fifth Circuit explained:
We agree with the oil companies that the 1911 deed unambiguously evinces an
intent to convey only the four specifically described tracts. The deed initially
states that "the property herein conveyed ... is four (4) tracts." It then pro-
vides a legal description of those four properties and further explains, more gen-
erally, that "the above described property herein conveyed is all the property"
that the McFaddens inherited from William McFadden. Finally, and somewhat
redundantly, the deed adds that it is intended to convey a one-eighth interest in
all the lands inherited by the McFaddens from William McFadden-a term al-
ready defined within the instrument as equal to the four described tracts.
Id.
16. Robbins, 952 F.2d at 904.
17. Id. at 904-05.
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183.18 The court noted that Robbins was required to prove superior title by
one of three ways: (1) proof of adverse possession; (2) proof of a regular
chain of conveyances out of the sovereign; or (3) proof of superior title from
a common source. 19 Robbins attempted to prove title by the second method.
In this connection, she introduced into evidence a deed from the State of
Texas to William McFadden, a deed from Anthony Lucas to Ephraim
Garonzik, and a deed from Garonzik to James Meaders. After the defend-
ants filed their motions for summary judgment pointing out the absence of
the link between McFadden and Lucas, Robbins produced an 1898 agree-
ment by the executor of William McFadden's estate to convey certain
properties to Anthony Lucas. This 1898 agreement did not identify any spe-
cific tracts being conveyed, rather it purported to convey an interest in the
"tracts and parcels of land of every description thereof in reference to Wm.
McFaddin [sic] estate."' 20 Robbins also relied on the inventory of McFad-
den's estate which listed interests in about twenty-five different tracts, in-
cluding Abstract No. 166 in Jefferson County. The inventory did not list
Abstract Nos. 181, 182, or 183. On this basis, the Fifth Circuit held that
Robbins failed to establish an unbroken chain of title to these three tracts
and was not entitled to share in any production from those tracts.2 1
Finally, the court held that, even if Robbins could establish title to all four
tracts, there was no evidence of damages.22 Each oil company (except Chev-
ron, which was severed from the action 23) produced summary judgment evi-
dence indicating that it had never produced minerals, or participated in any
production of any minerals, from any of the four tracts. Indeed, the only
lease in which any defendant had an interest in any of the four tracts was a
1944 lease to Sun E&P covering Abstract 182. As to this lease, the summary
judgment evidence showed that neither Sun E&P nor its assignees ever
drilled a well on the tract and that Sun E&P released its rights to the prop-
erty in 1963. This release occurred more than twenty-two years before Rob-
bins filed suit, and thus Robbins' claims against Sun E&P were held to be
barred by limitations.24
18. Id. at 905.
19. Id.
20. Id. (emphasis omitted).
21. Id. at 906.
22. Id.
23. Following severance, the district court granted summary judgment for Chevron, and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Id. at 903 n.2; see Robbins v. Chevron
USA, 940 F.2d 1529 (5th Cir. 1991) (unpublished).
24. Robbins, 952 F.2d at 906. According to the Fifth Circuit:
A party who seeks to recover damages for the extraction of minerals from his
land may either ratify an existing lease and sue for royalties or regard the lease
as invalid and sue for conversion. The statute of limitations is four years in the
former instance and two years in the latter. Irrespective of which theory Rob-





II. ISSUES INVOLVING OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. SURFACE EASEMENT
1. Temporary Injunctions
Petty v. Winn Exploration Co.25 concerned the interlocutory appeal of a
temporary injunction preventing a surface owner from interfering with the
lessee's access to the lands at issue. In 1970, Leta Glasscock granted an oil,
gas, and mineral lease ("the 1970 Glasscock Lease") to Winn Exploration
Company covering some of the property owned by Glasscock. The lease
expressly granted Winn the right to construct roads on the leased prem-
ises.26 At that time, Glasscock owned adjacent tracts of land that were later
referred to as the "1971 Glasscock Lease," the "Howett Lease," and the
"Bourge Lease." In 1977, Glasscock granted Winn a right-of-way easement
across the 1971 Glasscock Lease to permit access to the 1970 Glasscock
Lease from the Loma Vista County Road. Later in 1977 and 1978, Scott
Petty, Jr. acquired from Glasscock the surface estate of a large portion of
Glasscock's property, including all of the 1970 Glasscock Lease and most of
the 1971 Glasscock Lease.
In November 1989, Petty and Winn entered into an agreement whereby
Winn relinquished the 1977 easement from Glasscock across the 1971 Glass-
cock Lease, and Petty granted Winn a new easement permitting access to the
1970 Glasscock Lease through a different part of Petty's property which bor-
dered Farm to Market Road 1867. This November 1989 agreement between
Petty and Winn contained a provision making the easement subject to any
existing and superior easements, rights, and servitudes. 27 This new arrange-
ment resulted in Winn expending $150,000 to build an all-weather road
along the new easement. Apparently, Winn desired this arrangement be-
cause the Loma Vista County Road was poorly maintained.
In the meantime, Winn acquired a farmout covering parts of the 1971
Glasscock Lease, the Howett Lease, and the Bourge Lease. In December
1989, following completion of Winn's new road, Petty advised Winn that he
would be locking the gate on the old access road that connected the 1970
Glasscock Lease to the Loma Vista County Road. At that time, Petty au-
thorized Winn to access the farmout lands through the northwest corner of
Winn's 1970 Glasscock Lease. In August 1990, Winn sent Petty a letter
25. 816 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
26. The lease provided in part:
Lessor. ... does hereby grant, lease and let unto lessee the land covered hereby
for the purposes and with the exclusive right of exploring, drilling, mining and
operating for, producing and owning oil, gas, sulphur and all other minerals
.... together with the right to ... construct roads and bridges .... necessary or
useful in lessee's operations in exploring, drilling for, producing, treating, stor-
ing and transporting minerals produced from the land covered hereby or any
other land adjacent thereto.
Id. at 434.
27. The November 1989 "subject to" provision stated: "This roadway Permit is specifi-
cally made subject to any easements existing on said land and to any other rights or servitude
to which said land may be subject which are senior to the rights and privileges hereby
granted." Id. at 435.
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reflecting the terms of the December 1989 agreement as follows: (1) Winn
was to continue using the new road to access the 1970 Glasscock Lease from
FM 1867; (2) Winn was authorized to gain access to the farmout lands
through the northwest comer of the 1970 Glasscock Lease; and (3) Winn
agreed not to utilize the old access road off of the Loma Vista County Road.
Winn then cut the fence and installed a cattle guard near the northwest cor-
ner of the 1970 Glasscock Lease and commenced drilling operations on the
farmout acreage located on the 1971 Glasscock Lease.
Several weeks later, Petty notified Winn that he was rescinding Winn's
authority to cross the lease lines, and that Winn could thereafter gain access
to the farmout lands only by way of the old access road off of the Loma
Vista County Road. Additionally, Petty threatened termination of the 1989
right-of-way agreement. The next day, Petty had a gate welded across the
cattle guard between the 1970 Glasscock Lease and the 1971 Glasscock
Lease. Winn sought and obtained a temporary restraining order and later a
temporary injunction, prohibiting Petty from interfering with Winn's access
to the farmout lands through the northwest comer of the 1970 Glasscock
Lease. 28 Petty appealed.
The majority of the appellate panel noted that the dispositive issue on the
appeal of an interlocutory temporary injunction was whether the trial judge
abused his discretion in granting the injunctive relief.29 Following prior
Texas case law,30 the majority stated that the propriety of a temporary in-
junction against interference with an easement does not depend on the ulti-
mate merits of the controversy regarding the existence of the easement,
rather, in such situations, the controlling issue was whether there was evi-
dence of a bona fide dispute as to the easement's existence. 31 Under the
circumstances, the appellate court concluded that Petty failed to show an
abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 32 Accordingly, the trial court's judg-
ment was affirmed. 33
2. Locked Gates
In Wimberly v. Lone Star Gas Co.34 the court of appeals considered
28. Id. at 436.
29. Id. at 433.
30. See Egan v. Woodell, 720 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Richter v. Hickman, 243 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, no writ).
31. Petty, 816 S.W.2d at 433.
32. Specifically, the court held:
Considering the maze of oil leases, right of way leases, farm-out agreements, and
written agreements implicated by the evidence presented; the burdens placed
upon the appellant by the standard of review; the limitation upon this court in
reviewing such interlocutory orders; the legal recognition of the dominance of
mineral rights over surface rights; the legal construction favoring implied and
expressed easements in mineral lease cases; and the legal implications of "subject
to" clauses, we conclude that the appellant has failed to show that the trial judge




34. 818 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
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whether the surface owners' actions constituted unreasonable interference
with the lessee's right to use the surface easement. In 1964, E. J. and Fran-
ces Wimberly acquired a tract of land, apparently subject to an existing oil,
gas, and mineral lease in favor of Lone Star Gas Company. Lone Star had
two producing gas wells and related pipelines on the property. In 1988, the
relationship between the Wimberlys and Lone Star deteriorated, and the
Wimberlys changed the locks on the entrance gate to the property but did
not provide a key to Lone Star.
Lone Star filed suit against the Wimberlys, seeking, among other things, a
permanent injunction prohibiting the Wimberlys from denying Lone Star
access to its gas wells and pipelines on the property. The trial court granted
Lone Star summary judgment, permanently enjoining the Wimberlys. 35 The
Wimberlys appealed, claiming that Lone Star's summary judgment proof did
not establish entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law and that
there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether they committed
a wrongful act.
Lone Star's summary judgment affidavit stated that the Wimberlys denied
it access to its gas wells. E. J. Wimberly, in his affidavit, stated that he ran
cattle on the land and that he had problems with the theft of his cattle. E. J.
testified by way of affidavit that he periodically changed the locks at the
entrance to his property in order to monitor the people entering his prop-
erty. E. J. further stated that each time he received a phone call from Lone
Star requesting entry onto the property, he immediately went to the property
to allow Lone Star to enter. According to E. J.'s affidavit, he never denied
Lone Star access to the gas wells to the property. Similarly, Frances Wim-
berly stated in her affidavit that she had never locked out Lone Star or taken
any other action that would have denied or prevented Lone Star from gain-
ing entry onto the property. The Wimberlys claimed that this evidence at
least raised a fact issue as to whether the actions constituted unreasonable
interference with Lone Star's right to enter their property.
The court of appeals rejected this argument and distinguished Stout v.
Christian,36 upon which the Wimberlys heavily relied.37 That case also in-
volved a locked gate blocking an easement where the servient owner had
cattle on the property. In Stout, the court held that the issue of whether the
locking of the gate blocking the easement was an unreasonable interference
with the right to use the easement was a question of fact, where the use of
the easement interfered with the running of cattle on the servient estate.38
The court of appeals in the instant case noted that the easement deed in
Stout required closed gates and that the servient estate owner provided keys
to the dominant estate owner.39 Accordingly, the court held that although
the Wimberlys may be entitled to use locked gates on their property to pro-
35. Id. at 869.
36. 593 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
37. 818 S.W.2d at 872.
38. Stout, 593 S.W.2d at 150-51.
39. 818 S.W.2d at 872.
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tect their cattle, they must furnish Lone Star with a key to the gates. 4° Since
the Wimberlys did not do so, their conduct was held to constitute a wrongful
act as a matter of law, and therefore summary judgment was affirmed.41
B. ROYALTY ISSUES
1. No Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. v. Bruni 42 the court of appeals held that, under
the circumstances presented, an oil and gas lessee's negotiation of a take-or-
pay settlement did not result in a breach of duty of utmost good faith and
further held that such a duty does not ordinarily exist between a lessee and
lessor. 43 In 1974, the trustees of the Bruni Mineral Trust granted an oil, gas,
and mineral lease to Killam & Hurd, Ltd. Killam & Hurd drilled and com-
pleted nine producing gas wells on the property and entered into a long-term
gas sales contract with United Texas Transmission Company (UTTCO).
The contract included a take-or-pay provision which required UTTCO to
take a certain percentage of the annual deliverability of the wells covered by
the contract each year or to pay for any such gas it did not take. Killam &
Hurd eventually split into Hurd Enterprises, Ltd. and Killam Oil Company,
with each company obtaining one-half interest in the lease and the UTTCO
contract. UTTCO thereafter failed to take or pay for the required minimum
volume of gas. UTTCO eventually settled with Killam Oil and Hurd Enter-
prises, separately, for the take-or-pay deficiencies. In connection with these
settlements, Killam Oil and Hurd Enterprises received cash payments, and
UTTCO was released from all claims for take-or-pay deficiencies. Addition-
ally, the gas contract was cancelled.
Bruni learned of these settlements and sued Killam Oil and Hurd Enter-
prises on a variety of legal theories for failing to share the benefit of those
settlements. In this regard, Bruni asserted: (1) breach of the lease's royalty
provision;44 (2) breach of the implied marketing covenant; and (3) breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment with regard to royalty liability. The trial court deter-
mined that the gas royalty clause was applicable to the settlement payments
as a matter of law.45 After rendering partial summary judgment for Bruni,
the trial court severed the royalty liability claim, and Killam Oil and Hurd
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
43. Id. at 110.
44. The royalty provision in the lease provided:
The royalties to be paid by lessee are ... (b) on gas, including casinghead gas
and all gaseous substances, produced from said land and sold or used off the
premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or other product therefrom, the mar-
ket value at the mouth of the well of one-eight of the gas so sold or used pro-
vided that on gas sold at the wells the royalty shall be one-eighth of the amount
realized from such sale ....
Id. at 106 (emphasis added by court).




During the pendency of the royalty liability appeal, Killam Oil settled
with Bruni with regard to all claims except the royalty claim involved in the
appeal. The remaining claims against Hurd Enterprises proceeded to trial.
At trial, the jury found that: (1) Bruni's royalty share of Hurd's settlement
proceeds was $98,048; (2) Hurd did not breach the marketing covenant; (3) a
confidential relationship existed between Hurd and Bruni; and (4) Hurd
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by settling the contract
claims with UTTCO in the manner it did.47 The trial court entered judg-
ment for Bruni in accordance with these findings.4 8 Thereafter, appeal of
the royalty issue was decided in Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni49 when the court of
appeals reversed the summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of
Killam Oil and Hurd Enterprises with regard to the royalty claim, holding
as a matter of law that Bruni was not entitled to royalty on settlement pro-
ceeds arising from the take-or-pay provision of the UTTCO contract. 50
On appeal from the judgment following the trial, Hurd first contended
that the trial court erred in awarding $98,048 in royalty to Bruni, because, as
a matter of law, royalty owners are not entitled to share in take-or-pay settle-
ment proceeds. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in
this regard, 5 1 applying the "law of the case" doctrine. 52 Relying on its opin-
ion in the first appeal and the Texas Supreme Court's denial of writ of error
with regard to that case, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in
awarding royalty damages to Bruni.5 3
As to the trial court's judgment regarding breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing, Hurd contended that there is no such duty in a lessor/lessee
relationship. Bruni responded that it is not the relationship itself that gives
rise to the duty, but rather, the duty results from the nature of the confiden-
tial relationship between the parties which exists because of the lessee's
power to market the produced gas and the unequal bargaining power be-
tween the parties. The court rejected this analysis, noting that, in the ab-
sence of some other special relationship between the parties, the relationship
between lessor and lessee is purely contractual. 54 In reaching this result, the
court disagreed with Bruni's claim that the lessee's power to market gas
gives rise to such a special relationship. 55 Recognizing that a lessee is obli-
gated by an implied covenant in an oil, gas, and mineral lease to reasonably
46. Id.
47. Id. at 104-05.
48. Id. at 105.
49. 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
50. Id. at 268.
51. Hurd Enterprises, Ltd., 828 S.W.2d at 106, 112.
52. Id. at 106. The "law of the case" doctrine is "that principle under which questions of
law decided on appeal to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent
stages." Id. at 106 n.7 (quoting Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986)).
53. Id. at 106.
54. Id. at 107 (citing Cambridge Oil Co. v. Huggins, 765 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tex. App.-




market production from the lease,56 and that such duty requires the lessee to
market the production with due diligence and obtain the best price reason-
ably possible, 57 the court nevertheless concluded that the scope of such duty
is measured by the reasonably prudent operator standard and not by a high-
est good faith standard. 58
Turning to Bruni's claim that there was a special relationship between the
parties due to unequal bargaining power, the court noted that Bruni's argu-
ment was based on cases finding a special relationship between an insurer
and insured, because the insurer had exclusive control over evaluating,
processing, and denial of claims.59 The court concluded, however, that the
relationship between a lessor and lessee was distinguishable from that of an
insurer and insured because the lessee does not have the exclusive control
over the lessor as was present in the insurance cases,6° particularly because
the parties to the lease could negotiate and contractually define for them-
selves the lessee's royalty obligation. 61 Thus, finding no imbalance of bar-
gaining power in the lessor/lessee relationship requiring the imposition of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing,62 the court concluded as a matter law
of there was no confidential relationship between Hurd and Bruni, 63 and
therefore no duty of good faith and fair dealing.64
2. No Third-Party Beneficiary Status Under Gas Contracts
In Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co. 65 the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment denying royalty owners the right to
share in the proceeds from the settlement of a take-or-pay lawsuit. 66 In
1978, Mandell and others, as lessors, leased 260 acres of land to Hamman, as
lessee. In 1979, Hamman drilled and completed successful gas wells on the
property and thereafter entered into a gas purchase contract with Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Company. The gas contract contained a take-or-pay provision
56. Id.
57. Id. at 107-08.
58. Id. at 108.
59. Id. at 109. Bruni relied onAranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.
1988) and Arnold v. National Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
60. 828 S.W.2d at 109.
61. Id. at 110. The court explained:
The parties to the lease are free to decide and to define what returns from the
lease are to be regarded as "royalty." The lease transaction offers an opportu-
nity for the lessor to receive royalty with only limited risks (mainly, the risk the
lessee will not develop the lease and that drainage will remove the oil and/or gas
from under the lease before the royalty owner can receive royalty from produc-
tion by its lessee). On the one hand the lessee pays a bonus, takes the risks,
assumes the production costs, provides lease use gas to the lessor, and in certain
circumstances can lose the lease; while on the other hand the lessor can require




63. Id. at 112.
64. Id.
65. 822 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
66. Id. at 158. 166.
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obligating Tennessee to either take a certain percentage of the wells' deliver-
ability or pay Hamman for any such gas not taken.
In 1983, Tennessee advised Hamman that it would not honor its obliga-
tions under the take-or-pay provision of the contract. Hamman sued Ten-
nessee for breach of the contract's take-or-pay provision, and also for
Tennessee's unauthorized unilateral reduction in the contract price, and for
drainage caused by Tennessee's violation of the contract's ratable take provi-
sion. Ultimately, Hamman settled its lawsuit against Tennessee for $8 mil-
lion and allocated a share of the settlement proceeds to the royalty owners.
The portion of the settlement proceeds distributed to the royalty owners did
not include any amount allocable to the take-or-pay claim. The royalty
owners refused to accept Hamman's allocation of the settlement proceeds
and sued Hamman and Tennessee, asserting that they were entitled to share
in the take-or-pay portion of the settlement. The trial court granted a sum-
mary judgment, denying the claims of the royalty owners, who then
appealed. 67
The royalty owners' principal contention on appeal was that the trial
court erred in finding that they were not sellers or third-party beneficiaries
under the Hamman-Tennessee contract. The court found that the lease pro-
vided the royalty owners with the option of either accepting their propor-
tionate share of the proceeds from the sale of lease production sold under the
contract or electing to take their share of gas produced from the lease in kind
and negotiate their own gas contract with Tennessee or some other pur-
chaser.68 The evidence demonstrated to the court that the royalty owners
never elected to take their share of gas in kind. 69 Moreover, the court em-
67. Id. at 157.
68. Id. at 160. The leases provided for royalties: "[o]n gas, including casinghead gas or
other gaseous substance, 1/4 of 8/8ths (one-fourth of eight-eighths) of all produced, excepting
that used for routine lease operations or unavoidably lost in conducting such operations." Id.
at 156. The leases further provided that the lessor had:
the right to take his royalty share of any production either in kind or value, at
Lessor's election. Said royalty, whether in kind or value, shall be delivered free
of cost to Lessor or Lessor's credit at the same delivery point at which Lessee
disposes of its share of the same product.
Id. With regard to the marketing of production the leases obligated the lessee to "promptly
furnish Lessor with copies of all proposals made to or received by Lessee from third parties for
the purchase of any such production." Id. Once the lessee negotiated a contract for the sale of
gas and provided a copy to the lessor, then the lessor was required by the leases' provisions to
notify lessee in writing, within 30 days after receipt of the contract "as to whether Lessor elects
to either (i) approve such contract or (ii) take in kind and separately dispose of Lessor's royalty
share of such production." Id. The leases provided that the lessor's failure to give written
notice of election "shall be conclusively deemed an election to approve the contract proposed
by Lessee." Id.
69. Id. at 160. According to the court:
Appellants were required to affirmatively elect under the leases to take their
royalty share in kind. Paragraph 3(d) of the lease gave appellants the opportu-
nity to negotiate a gas purchase contract with Tennessee, if appellants had noti-
fied Hamman, in writing, that they would take their share in kind. The evidence
indicates that appellants failed to give notice within the 30 day period after Mr.
Hamman tendered the Hamman-Tennessee contract to them and, thus, elected
to approve the contract and receive royalties based on production.
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phasized that the royalty owners were not signatories to the Hamman-Ten-
nessee contract and no reference to the royalty owners appeared anywhere in
the contract. 70 In addition, the court noted that the royalty owners had
never communicated with Tennessee about the provisions of the contract
during the seven years which preceded the filing of the lawsuit and never
made any demand upon Tennessee for take-or-pay payments under the
contract. 7'
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the royalty owners
did not have title to, or the right to sell, gas produced from the lease under
the Hamman-Tennessee contract and did not have the legal capacity to sell
gas to Tennessee under the contract.72 The royalty owners never undertook
any action indicating that they claimed any such right.73 On this basis, the
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's find-
ing that the royalty owners were not parties to the Hamman-Tennessee
contract. 74
The court also held that the royalty owners were not third-party benefi-
ciaries to the Hamman-Tennessee contract. 75 In Texas, a contract will not
be interpreted as having been made for the benefit of a third party unless it
clearly appears that such was the intention of the contracting parties.76 In
this instance, the gas purchase contract was executed by Tennessee and
Hamman. The evidence indicated to the court that the royalty owners did
not have any agreement with Tennessee concerning satisfaction of royalty
obligations and had not been involved in any communications, conversa-
tions, or dealings with Tennessee during or following the negotiation of the
Hamman-Tennessee contract. 77 Instead, the court noted, all of the royalty
owners' communications had been with Hamman. 71 Of further significance
to the court, the Hamman-Tennessee contract made no provision for the
payment of royalty obligations. 79 Based on these facts and evidence that
none of the royalty owners had ever advised Tennessee that they considered
themselves parties to the gas purchase contract, the court concluded that the
royalty owners were not third-party beneficiaries to the Hamman-Tennessee
contract.80
The court also rejected the royalty owners' contention that Hamman had
breached its implied obligation to reasonably market production by refusing
to share the proceeds from the settlement of its take-or-pay claim. 8' The
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 161.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 159.
75. Id. at 161.
76. Id. (citing Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Allied Fairbanks Bank, 678 S.W.2d 574,
577 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lone





81. Id. at 165.
1602 [Vol. 46
OIL, GAS, MINERAL
royalty owners testified that the contract negotiated by Hamman was supe-
rior in all respects. In particular, the contract contained a pricing provision
which yielded the highest possible price for the gas, contained a favored na-
tions provision, an annual price redetermination clause, and factored prices
based upon the MMBTU content of the gas. Noting that under the implied
marketing covenant, the lessee must make certain that the gas produced
under the lease is sold for the best price or under the best terms available,
82
the court concluded that Hamman's conduct satisfied this test.8 3 The fact
that the royalty owners were not entitled to share in the take-or-pay pay-
ments under the contract did not change the court's opinion because the
court reasoned that take-or-pay payments are not payments for production,
but instead are payments for non-production.8 4 The receipt of such pay-
ments does not give rise to a royalty obligation or trigger exposure under the
implied marketing covenant of the lease.8 5
3. Sulphur Royalties
Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co. 86 concerned the issue of whether the gas
royalty clause or the sulphur royalty clause in an oil, gas, and mineral lease8 7
applies to sulphur recovered from natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide.
In this opinion, the court determined that the lease royalty provisions at
issue were ambiguous and remanded the case for jury trial.88 The
Schwartzes were the lessors under certain oil, gas, and mineral leases that
were ultimately acquired by Prairie. Three gas wells were completed on the
leases, which produced sour gas. 89 Prairie contracted with Cities Service
Company to transport the gas from the wellhead to a processing facility,
where it recovered sulphur from the gas. Cities Service kept a portion of the
recovered sulphur in accordance with the processing arrangement and re-
turned the remainder to Prairie, which sold the sulphur to third parties.
Prairie contended that the sulphur royalty clause was applicable, and it
tendered to the Schwartzes royalty in the amount of $1.00 per long ton of
recovered sulphur. The Schwartzes refused the payments, contending that
82. Id. at 164.
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id. at 164-65.
85. Id. (relying on Killam Oil Co. v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1991, writ denied)).
86. 833 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd).
87. The royalty provision in the leases at issue stated:
As royalty, lessee covenants and agrees ... (b) To pay lessor on gas and casing-
head gas produced from said land (1) when sold by lessee, 1/4 of the amount
realized by lessee, computed at the mouth of the well, or (2) when used by lessee
off said land or in the manufacture of gasoline or other products, the market
value, at the mouth of the well, of 1/4 of such gas and casinghead gas; (c) To
pay lessor on all other minerals mined and marketed or utilized by lessee from
said land, one-tenth either in kind or value at the well or mine at lessee's elec-
tion, except that on sulphur mined and marketed the royalty shall be one dollar
per long ton.
Id. at 631.
88. Id. at 632.
89. "Sour gas" is natural gas that contains hydrogen sulfide. Id. at 630.
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they were entitled to royalties under the gas royalty clause reasoning that the
sulphur was simply part of the gas stream at the time of processing and not a
separate mineral. On this basis, the Schwartzes claimed royalties were due
in the amount of one-fourth of Prairie's net proceeds from the sale of the
sulphur. Suit followed.
Originally, the trial court granted summary judgment for Prairie.90 That
judgment was appealed, 91 and on appeal each member of the appellate panel
in that case wrote a separate opinion: one justice reversed and remanded,
holding that royalty should be determined under the gas royalty clause;92
another found the royalty provisions ambiguous; 93 and the third found that
the sulphur royalty clause controlled. 94 The case was remanded for a jury
trial on the merits.95 However, the case was not decided by the jury because
at trial Prairie was granted an instructed verdict, and judgment was entered
that the Schwartzes take nothing.96 The Schwartzes appealed again.
On this appeal, the Schwartzes contended that the leases unambiguously
provided for royalty on hydrogen sulfide gas under the gas royalty clause
but, alternatively, claimed that the lease royalty clause was ambiguous and
the evidence at trial raised fact issues regarding which portion of the royalty
clause was applicable. Reviewing the evidence, the court noted that Prairie's
expert witnesses had testified that: (1) hydrogen sulfide is a gas; (2) sulphur
does not exist at the wellhead except in trace amounts; (3) all sulphur recov-
ered is obtained from gas at the processing plant; (4) a sour gas well is not a
sulphur mine; and (5) sulphur produced from hydrogen sulfide gas is consid-
ered "recovered sulphur" and not "mined sulphur."' 97 Based on this and
other evidence, the court determined that the royalty provisions were ambig-
uous and that there was evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue re-
garding which lease clause applied. 98 Accordingly, the instructed verdict
was reversed, and the case was remanded for new trial on the merits.99
C. OTHER ISSUES
1. Self Dealing By Executive
In Dearing, Inc. v. Spiller'00 the holder of the executive rights to lease
minerals was found to have breached the duty of utmost good faith owed to
non-executive mineral interest owners by leasing the property to an entity
controlled by the executive upon less than fair market terms.' 0 ' In 1943, the
90. Id.
91. Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co., 727 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. Id. at 292-93 (Cohen, J.).
93. Id. at 293 (Dunn, J., concurring only in the judgment).
94. Id. at 293-94 (Bass, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 293.
96. 833 S.W.2d at 630.
97. Id. at 631-32.
98. Id. at 632.
99. Id.
100. 824 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
101. Id. at 732.
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Haag family conveyed the fee interest in a certain 600-acre tract to Dearing,
Inc.'s predecessor in interest, reserving an undivided one-half mineral inter-
est. The deed granted Dearing's predecessor the executive right 10 2 with re-
gard to the reserved mineral interest and required that any oil and gas leases
provide for at least one-eighth royalty. The appellees succeeded to the inter-
est of the Haag family.
In 1944, Dearing granted an oil and gas lease on the tract to Shell for one-
eighth royalty. By 1980, the lease was held by production from a single well.
The area then became "hot" due to the discovery of a new producing forma-
tion. Dearing purchased the well and stopped production, causing the Shell
lease to terminate. Dearing then granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease to
Royal Petroleum Corp.
The circumstances surrounding the lease to Royal were highly unusual.
First, although the lease to Royal provided for one-eighth royalty, it did not
provide for the payment of bonus and did not contain a Pugh clause, both
provisions being routinely present in oil and gas leasing transactions. 10 3 Sec-
ond, prior to Dearing's granting of the lease to Royal, Dearing received writ-
ten lease proposals from others offering better terms, yet these offers were
declined by Dearing. 104 Third, like Dearing, Royal was owned and operated
by the Dearing family,' 0 5 and Herman Dearing, president of Dearing and
Royal, made no effort to lease the property to a third party because he
wanted to "keep it in the family."
The appellees brought suit against Dearing and Royal, seeking actual and
exemplary damages for Dearing's breach of the duty of utmost good faith,
for an accounting of the net profits under the new lease, for cancellation of
the lease, and for termination of the executive right as to their undivided
mineral interest. The trial court, based on a jury verdict favorable to the
appellees, awarded judgment for the appellees, granting the relief sought. 106
Dearing appealed, claiming, among other things, that: (1) Dearing did not
owe the appellees a duty of utmost good faith because no such duty was
explicitly imposed in the 1943 deed and (2) Dearing did not breach any such
duty because the lease to Royal complied with the 1943 deed's sole require-
ment that future leases provide for at least one-eighths royalty.
With regard to the existence of the duty of utmost good faith, the court
noted that as early as 1937 (six years prior to the 1943 deed) Texas courts
had accepted the utmost good faith standard for executives 0 7 and that the
102. The executive right is the exclusive right to execute oil and gas leases. HOWARD R.
WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 415 (8th ed. 1992).
103. A Pugh clause generally provides that drilling operations on, or production from,
pooled units shall maintain the lease only as to the lands that are included in such producing
unit(s). Dearing, Inc., 824 S.W.2d at 730 n.l.
104. In 1981, a prospective lessee offered three-sixteenths royalty with $35 per acre bonus.
Later, another prospective lessee offered one-quarter royalty, $100 per acre bonus, and a con-
tinuous drilling obligation. Id. at 730-31.
105. Dearing and Royal had an identity of officers, directors and shareholders, and both
had the same business address and phone number. Id. at 731 n.3.
106. Id. at 731.
107. Id. at 732 (citing Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 631, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1937)).
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Texas Supreme Court had recently applied the same standard in an analo-
gous situation, equating the standard to a fiduciary obligation.' 0 8 On this
basis, the court concluded that the duty of utmost good faith is implied by
law in the relationship between an executive and non-executive, and its exist-
ence is not dependent upon specific language in the instrument creating the
executive right.10 9 Accordingly, the court held that, in this case, Dearing
owed the appellees the duty of utmost good faith with regard to the exercise
of the executive right. "10
After reviewing the evidence, the court found that Dearing had breached
this duty.I' The court construed the requirement in the 1943 deed, that
royalties be no less than one-eighth, to merely establish a minimum royalty
and held that this language did not supplant the legal standard which re-
quires the holder of the executive right to exercise that right to obtain "the
highest royalty possible."' " 2 Noting that the duty of utmost good faith is
not necessarily satisfied by obtaining the minimum required royalty, the
court concluded that because the lease to Royal did not provide for the "fair
market royalty prevalent in the surrounding area at that time," Dearing had
breached the duty owed to the appellees by virtue of his status as holder of
the executive right. 13
2. No Obligation to Unleased Interest Owner in Absence of Ratification
In Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Pitzer 1 4 the court of appeals de-
nied a claim for royalties asserted against the operator of a unit by an un-
leased mineral owner whose interest had not been included in the unit.' 1 5
This suit had its origin in the formation of a 5,677.35-acre unit for secondary
recovery purposes by the predecessor of Sun. At the time, the plaintiffs
owned an undivided one-half mineral interest in a 255.5-acre tract situated
within the boundary of the unit. However, Sun's predecessor apparently
mistakenly attributed the plaintiffs' ownership interest to others who had
granted it oil, gas, and mineral leases, and failed to include the plaintiffs'
interest in the unit. Although there had been production from the unit,
there had been no production from the 255.5-acre tract.
The plaintiffs sued Sun, seeking damages for unpaid royalties attributable
to their interest. The jury found that Sun was negligent in "not obtaining a
108. Id. (citing Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 733.
112. Id.
113. Id. The court also indicated that an executive is prohibited from self dealing, through
spouses, children, agents, employees, and all others whose interests are closely identified with
the executives and seemed to suggest that Dearing breached the duty of utmost good faith
when it dealt with its "agent", a closely held corporation. Id. Although stating that it did not
intend to imply that an executive is barred, as a matter of law, from developing the premises
himself, the court nevertheless stated that clear evidence of breach of the executive duty exists
if the market value of the lease is much greater than the terms the executive grants to himself.
Id. at 734.
114. 822 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
115. Id. at 295.
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lease from Plaintiffs and not joining Plaintiffs' mineral interest in the unit,"
and that such negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs damages in the
amount of $32,863.00.116 The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs
for that amount plus pre-judgment interest.' 17 Sun appealed.
In a very short opinion, the appellate court held that Sun had no obliga-
tion to pay royalties to the plaintiffs because: (1) there was no production
from the 255.5-acre tract upon which royalties could be due; 1' 8 and (2) the
plaintiffs never ratified the unitization agreement so as to have a claim to a
share of unit production. 19 The court reasoned that because there was no
obligation to pay royalties to the plaintiffs prior to ratification, the plaintiffs
had no cause of action for negligent failure to pay.' 20 Consequently, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment against Sun and ren-
dered judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing against Sun.121
3. Payment of Lease Consideration by Personal Check
At issue in TSB Exco, Inc. v. E.N. Smith, III Energy Corp. 122 was whether
payment for an extension of an oil and gas lease was properly tendered by
the delivery of a personal check. On July 6, 1983, the owners of two tracts
of land granted oil and gas leases to TSB's predecessor in interest. The
leases had an original primary term of five years, and they provided the
lessee with an option to extend the primary term for an additional five
years. 123 The working interest in the leases was eventually assigned to TSB.
In June 1988, several weeks prior to the expiration of the original primary
term, Smith Energy contacted the landowners and obtained an option to
lease the same lands covered by the TSB leases, upon expiration of such
leases. On July 1, 1988, a representative of TSB delivered to the lessors
personal checks in the correct amounts for the purpose of extending the
leases for another five years. Smith Energy's agent learned of this and ad-
vised the lessors to hold the checks without negotiating them until after July
6 because such checks might not constitute proper tender of payment. The
116. Id.
117. Id. at 294.




122. 818 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
123. The option provided:
Lessee is hereby given the option, to be exercised prior to the date on which this
lease or any portion thereof would expire . . . .of extending this lease for a
period of five (5) years as to all or any portion of acreage then held hereunder
.... the only action required by Lessee to exercise this option being the payment
to Lessor (or for Lessor's credit to depository bank named herein) of the addi-
tional consideration of the sum of $75.00 per acre for each acre or so extended,
which payment shall cover (the first year of) the extended term. No rental pay-
ments shall be due on the acreage so extended during the period following such
payment and ending on the following anniversary date of this lease, but [annual]
rentals shall be due on or before such following anniversary date and succeeding
anniversary dates thereafter.
Id. at 419 (emphasis of court omitted).
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lessors held the checks until July 7 when they returned them to TSB. There-
after, the landowners executed new leases covering the property to Smith
Energy. TSB sued Smith Energy and the landowners for breach of contract,
tortious interference, and for a declaratory judgment that the leases had been
extended by its tender of the checks. Following a bench trial, the court ren-
dered a take nothing judgment, holding, among other things, that: the
checks did not constitute proper tender; the landowners did not waive any
right to require cash payment and were not estopped to demand cash; and,
Smith Energy did not tortiously interfere with TSB's leases.1 24
TSB appealed, arguing that its delivery of the checks in the proper
amounts prior to the expiration of the option constituted proper payment
within the meaning of the lease provision. The appellate court agreed for
two reasons. 125 First, the court adopted the rule set forth in section 249 of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,1 26 which authorizes payments to be
made in any manner acceptable in the ordinary course of business in the
absence of a demand for payment in legal tender. 27 Noting that an oil and
gas lease is a contract and must be construed as a contract, the appellate
court applied section 249 to the lease provision at issue.1 28 The trial court
had previously found that checks are used for payment of obligations in oil
and gas leases, including option payments, in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, and that the landowners made no demand for cash payment when the
checks were presented or at any time before the expiration of the option. 129
Therefore, according to section 249, TSB's timely delivery of the checks to
the lessors constituted proper payment.130
Second, the court interpreted the leases themselves to authorize payment
by check. ' 3' After examining the other provisions in the leases, the appellate
court noted that in all other situations, the leases explicitly provided that
payments to the lessors may be made by check.' 3 2 One such provision au-
thorizing payment by check was the delay rental provision. 33 The court
held that the provision for optional extension of the primary term was re-
124. Id. at 420.
125. Id. at 420-21.
126. Section 249 provides:
Where the payment or offer of money is made a condition of an obligor's duty,
payment or offer of payment in any manner current in the ordinary course of
business satisfies the requirement unless the obligee demands payment in legal
tender and gives any extension of time reasonably necessary to procure it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 249 (1981).
127. TSB Exco, Inc., 818 S.W.2d at 421.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 420-21.
130. Id. at 421.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. The delay rental clauses in the leases provided that payment or tender of rentals:
may be made by check or draft of Lessee delivered or mailed to the authorized
depository bank or to Lessor (at the address last known to Lessee) on or before
such date for payment, and the payment or tender will be deemed made when




lated to the delay rental provisions and that the two provisions should be
interpreted together.1 34 Since the delay rental provisions expressly author-
ized payment by checks, the court held that the payments for lease exten-
sions could likewise be tendered in the same fashion.' 3 5 The appellate court
therefore reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment that
TSB's leases were in full force and effect and that Smith's leases were inva-
lid. ' 36 The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination as to the
amount of extension payment and delay rentals to which the lessors were
entitled. 137
4. Express Production-and-Allotment Requirements
In Parten v. Cannon138 the court of appeals held that the failure of an oil
and gas lessee to file a proper written description of land held by production
at the end of the lease's primary term as required by the express terms of the
lease 139 merely constituted a breach of covenant, not a breach of condi-
tion,140 which did not cause the lease to terminate at the expiration of its
134. Id. at 421.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 423 (on rehearing).
137. Id.
138. 829 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, writ denied).
139. Paragraph 18 of the lease provided in relevant part:
Lessee must within ninety (90) days after the end of the primary term of this lease
as to the leased premises which is not pooled under the provisions of Paragraph 4
hereof designate in writing and place same of record with the County Clerk in
Madison County, Texas, a description of that part of the leased premises which
shall be allotted to such well for production purposes, no more than 320 acres plus
10% tolerance to be allotted in and around each well classified as a gas well by
the Railroad Commission of Texas, if completed at a depth of 8,500 feet or less
below the surface nor more than 640 acres plus 10% tolerance to such gas well if
completed at a depth of more than 8,500 feet below the surface, and no more
than 10 acres plus 10% tolerance to be allotted in and around each well classi-
fied as an oil well by the Railroad Commission of Texas if completed at a depth
of 2,500 feet or less below the surface. In the case of an oil well completed at a
depth of more than 2,500 feet below the surface, there shall be allotted to that
well for production purposes no more land than is allowed by the permanent
field rules of the Railroad Commission for oil units for that horizon, nor more
than 80 acres in the absence of permanent rules. Production or operations on
said allotted area by the Lessee shall maintain this lease in effect only with regard
to the land within the described area. This lease shall terminate as to such part or
parts of the leased land lying outside the allotted area unless this lease is perpetu-
ated as to such land outside the allotted area by operations conducted thereon or
by production of oil or gas or by such operations and such production in accord-
ance with the provisions hereof.
Id. at 329 (emphasis added by court). The court referred to the first sentence of Paragraph 18
as the "designation-and-filing provision" and to the last two sentences of the paragraph as the
"production-and-allotment provision." See id. at 330.
140. The court explained the differences between covenants and conditions as follows:
In construing paragraph 18, we note that an important distinction exists be-
tween a condition and a covenant. See Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 772
S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Rogers, the
distinction between conditions and covenants lies in the appropriate remedy for
their breach. Id. Breach of a condition results in automatic termination of the
leasehold estate upon the happening of the stipulated events. Id. Breach of a
covenant does not automatically terminate the estate, but instead subjects the
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primary term. ' 4' The undisputed facts at trial established that the primary
term of the lease ended on January 7, 1981, at which time five wells were
producing in paying quantities and that the lessee never recorded a written
designation allocating any portion of the lease to the producing wells. After
the end of the primary term, the lessee completed six additional producing
wells. In October 1986, the lessor opposed any further drilling activities on
the lease, claiming that the lease had terminated due to the lessee's failure to
comply with the requirements of Paragraph 18.
In reviewing the terms of the lease, the court of appeals first addressed the
production-and-allotment provision. Relying upon the decision in Mayfield
v. de Benavides,142 which involved a similar lease provision, the court deter-
mined that the production-and-allotment provision, like the one involved in
Mayfield, constituted an express condition specifying the maximum acreage
that could be allotted to each producing well situated on the lease.' 43 Ac-
cording to the court, this provision created a "special limitation" which, if
breached, would support a decree of lease termination. 44
The court then analyzed the designation-and-filing provision, and deter-
mined that it created a covenant, not a condition. "45 In making this determi-
nation, the court emphasized the intent of the parties expressed in the last
sentence of Paragraph 18.146 According to the court, this sentence demon-
strated that the parties intended that perpetuation of the lease beyond the
primary term would be conditioned upon operations or production of oil or
gas on the allotted portions of the lease rather than upon the filing of a
written designation of productive acreage. 147 In reaching this conclusion,
the court also emphasized that the circumstances surrounding the making of
the lease, as evidenced by contemporaneous correspondence between the
parties, showed that the concern of the parties was to have undeveloped por-
tions of the lease released to the lessors at the end of the primary term, but
the parties never intended a forfeiture to occur on portions of the lease other-
wise held by operations or production. 148 Thus, finding the designation-and-
breaching party to liability for monetary damages or, in extraordinary circum-
stances, the remedy of a conditional decree of cancellation. Id. Doubts should
be resolved in favor of a covenant instead of a condition. Id. According to the
court in Rogers, the language used by the parties to an oil and gas lease will not
be held to impose a special limitation on the grant unless it is clear and precise
and so unequivocal that it can reasonably be given no other meaning. Id.
829 S.W.2d at 329-30.
141. Id. at 331.
142. 693 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
143. Parten, 829 S.W.2d at 330.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 331.
146. Id. at 330.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 330-31. According to the court:
If, in light of surrounding circumstances, the language of a contract appears to
be capable of only a single meaning, the court can confine itself to the writing.
Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981). The sur-
rounding circumstances, as reflected in John Parten's letter of II December
1975 to Ernest Cannon, involved the Cannons' concern that one well could "tie
up a whole block of acreage for a long time," and the Partens' intent "to drill
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filing provision to be a covenant and not a condition, the court held that the
lessee's alleged breach of its provisions would give rise to a claim for dam-
ages, but would not support automatic termination of the lease. 149 The
court concluded, however, that it was not required to determine whether the
designation-and-filing provision had been breached because the lessors had
previously abandoned their claim for damages.150
Having determined that the production-and-allotment provision did cre-
ate a condition which, if breached, would support a decree of lease cancella-
tion, the court then undertook the task of determining what portion of the
lease had been maintained by operations or production attributable to lease
wells as of the end of the primary term. 15' In this regard, the court consid-
ered the parties' stipulation to the effect that: (1) Well 4 held 148.33-acres
(referred to as Tract A) at the end of the primary term, and the well pro-
duced until August 1987; (2) Well 6 held 161-acres (referred to as Tract B)
at the end of the primary term and produced until May 1981; (3) Well 7 held
650-acres at the end of the primary term as a gas well but was reclassified in
May 1982 as an oil well holding 161-acres (referred to as Tract C) which
continued to produce at the time of trial; and (4) Well 8 held 161-acres (re-
ferred to as Tract D) at the end of the primary term, and the well produced
until July 1985.152 Based on these stipulations, the court determined that at
the end of the primary term the lease had been perpetuated as to Tracts A,
B, C, and D. 153
Noting that Wells 4, 6, and 8 had ceased to produce at various points
following expiration of the lease's primary term and that Well 7 had subse-
quently been reclassified as an oil well instead of a gas well, the court then
addressed the issue of what portions of the lease remained currently in ef-
fect.154 With respect to this matter, the lessee contended that because Well 7
had been classified as a producing gas well at the end of the primary term
with a 640 acre proration unit being assigned to it at that time, the well was
sufficient by itself to perpetuate the entire 658 acre lease for so long as the
well continued to produce. The court rejected this argument, however, con-
struing the provisions of Paragraph 18 to mean that reclassification of Well 7
as an oil well resulted in the lease being undeveloped to the extent of the
acreage which existed outside the 161 acre proration unit assigned to the
reclassified Well 7.155 With regard to Tract A, production from Well 4 was
and return to [the Cannons] the acreage that is not producing at the end of five
years." The plain language of the lease indicates that, although undeveloped
portions of the lease would be returned to the Cannons, the parties never in-
tended a forfeiture to occur on portions of the lease maintained by operations or
production beyond the primary term.
Id. (alteration in original).





154. Id. at 331-32.
155. Id. at 331; see also Nafco Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Tartan Resources Corp., 522 S.W.2d 703,
708 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (the habendum clause of a lease
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stipulated to have ceased in August 1987. Prior to that time, however, the
lessors had opposed further drilling by the lessee. Relying upon the well-
established principle that a lessor who wrongfully repudiates a lease cannot
complain if the lessee suspends operations pending determination of the con-
troversy, 5 6 the court concluded that the lessee was under no obligation to
conduct further operations on Tract A pending resolution of the case,157 and
accordingly, held that the lease remained valid as to Tract A.158 With re-
gard to Wells 6 and 8 on Tracts B and D, respectively, the court concluded
that factual issues remained regarding: (1) whether other wells on those
tracts had produced without cessation for more than ninety consecutive
days; (2) whether operations on additional wells located on those tracts had
commenced within ninety days following cessation of production from other
wells; and (3) whether the lessors had repudiated the lease prior to the time
any of such wells had ceased production. 59 Because of the presence of these
unresolved fact issues, the court reversed and remanded the case to the trial
court for determination of the issues regarding Tracts B and D, but decreed
that the lease remained in effect as to Tracts A and C. '6
5. Validity of Lease Options Under Veterans Land Program
In a case of first impression, the district court in Wade v. Texaco Trading
& Transportation, Inc. 161 held that the oil and gas lease at issue was not void
by reason of the provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code 162 relating
to the Veterans Land Program. 163 In 1976, the Wades purchased the surface
and one-half mineral interest in a particular seventy-five-acre tract, pursuant
to an assignment of purchase rights under the Veteran Land Board Program.
In February 1978, the Wades granted an oil, gas, and mineral lease to
County Management, Inc. The lease had a primary term of five years, and it
contained a provision granting County Management an option to extend the
primary term for an additional five years. In February 1988, County Man-
agement exercised the option and thereafter drilled and completed a produc-
ing oil and gas well. Production from the well was sold to various
purchasers, and the Wades received proper royalty payments for this
production.
In 1990, the Wades filed suit against County Management and the pur-
chasers of production for a judicial declaration that the lease was void under
operated independently on each tract and gas production on one tract would not maintain the
lease on another tract); Hunt Oil Co. v. Dishman, 352 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (except for acreage allotted to oil production, the determina-
ble fee on a mineral tract allotted to gas production was forfeited when a gas well was reclassi-
fied as an oil well and no reworking operations looking to further gas production were
attempted).
156. See Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 56, 60, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957).
157. Parten, 829 S.W.2d at 332.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 332-33.
161. 779 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
162. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 1.001-201.041 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1993).
163. Wade, 779 F. Supp. at 70.
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section 161.227 of the Texas Natural Resources Code. 164 The Wades
claimed that section 161.227(b) prohibited options in all leases on veteran's
land. The defendants argued that section 161.227(b) did not apply to oil,
gas, and mineral leases because such leases were expressly excluded from
operation of the statute in section 161.227(a) and that such exclusion was
applicable to section 161.227(b).
In analyzing this issue, the court began by noting that the Natural Re-
sources Code states that its codification of existing statute law was intended
to be without substantive change.1 65 The court then considered the text of
the statute that was codified as section 161.227.166 The court construed the
predecessor statute as excluding oil and gas leases from both the ten-year
limitation and the prohibition against options. 167 According to the court,
the codified version omitted several crucial phrases from the former statute
that made it clear that oil and gas leases were excluded from the prohibition
against options. 168 Reasoning that section 161.227 cannot be read to change
the substance of the former statute, 169 the court held that the code section
did not prohibit options in oil and gas leases like the one at hand.17 0 In
addition, the court found that the statutory predecessor of section 161.227
pertained to surface leases171 and not to oil and gas leases, which were gov-
erned by the precursor of section 161.228.172 The latter contained no prohi-
164. In 1978, the code provided:
(a) No land purchased under this chapter may be leased by the purchaser for a
term of more than 10 years except for oil, gas and other minerals and as long
after 10 years as minerals are produced from the land in commercial quantities.
(b) No lease may contain a provision for option or renewal of the lease or re-
lease of the property for any term, and the taking of an option, renewal, or re-
lease agreement in a separate instrument to take effect in the future is prohib-
ited. A lease or instrument that contains an option, renewal, or re-lease agree-
ment in violation of this section is expressly declared to be void.
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 161.227 (Vernon 1978) (amended 1981).
165. Wade, 779 F. Supp at 69 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 1.001
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993), but probably referring to TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1.001
(Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1993)).
166. As originally adopted, the predecessor of section 161.227 provided:
Any land purchased under the provisions of this Act may not be leased by the
purchaser for any term exceeding ten (10) years except for oil, gas or other
minerals and so long thereafter as any minerals may be produced therefrom in
commercial quantities, and no such lease shall contain any provision for option
or renewal of such lease or re-lease of such property for any term. The taking of
any option, renewal or re-lease agreement in a separate instrument to take effect
in the future is prohibited; and any such lease or instrument containing such an
option, renewal or re-lease agreement executed after the effective date of this Act
in violation hereof is expressly declared to be void.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5421m § 17 (Vernon 1962 & Supp. 1976) (repealed 1977).
167. Wade, 779 F. Supp. at 70.
168. Id. "The 1978 version split the 1955 version into two separate subsections. In doing
so, the 1978 version omits 'and no such' 'and any such', phrases that made the exclusion of oil
and gas leases from the ten year limitation also apply to the prohibition against options." Id.
at 70 n.2.
169. Id. at 70.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (referring to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5421m § 18 (Vernon 1962 & Supp.
1976) (repealed 1977)). Section 161.228(b), as it existed in 1978, read as follows: "No oil, gas
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bition against options in oil and gas leases, and the court found that omission
to be significant, reasoning that if the legislature had intended to prohibit
options in oil and gas leases, it would have done so in section 161.228(b),
which governs the intended limitations on oil and gas leases, rather than in
section 161.227.173 On the basis of these arguments, the court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, finding that the Wades' claims failed as a
matter of law because the lease was not void under section 161.227.1 74
III. ISSUES INVOLVING STATE REGULATION
A. RULE 37 SPACING EXCEPTION
In Schlachter v. Railroad Commission of Texas175 the court of appeals
upheld the Railroad Commission's denial of an application for an exception
to Rule 37,176 the statewide well-spacing rule.177 Rule 37 generally prohibits
the drilling of any well nearer than 467 feet to any property line, lease line,
or subdivision line unless the Railroad Commission grants an exception in
order to prevent waste or the confiscation of property.1 78 In this case,
Schlachter's well was located 173 feet from an adjacent lease boundary. The
well had been producing from the Chapel Hill (Rodessa) Field. Schlachter
intended to recomplete the well in the Chapel Hill (Pettit) Field. The adja-
cent leaseholder protested Schlachter's application. Following a hearing, the
Commission denied Schlachter's request, and a Travis County district court
upheld the Commission's decision. 179
Schlachter appealed, claiming that he was entitled to a Rule 37 exception
for the prevention of waste on the basis of the Texas Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Exxon Corp. v. Railroad Commission.' 80 According to Schlachter,
the Exxon decision created a new category of waste, other than physical
waste, that justified the granting of a Rule 37 exception. Schlachter argued
that he was entitled to a spacing exception, as a matter of law, due to "eco-
nomic waste," because he could recomplete the well in the Pettit formation
or mineral lease may be for a primary term of more than 10 years and the lease may provide
that it shall remain in force as long as production is obtained in paying quantities." TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 161.228(b) (Vernon 1978) (amended 1981).
173. Wade, 779 F. Supp. at 70.
174. Id.
175. 825 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
176. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37 (West Supp. 1992-93) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Statewide
Spacing Rule).
177. Schlachter, 825 S.W.2d at 741.
178. Rule 37 provides:
No well for oil, gas, or geothermal resource shall hereafter be drilled nearer than
1,200 feet to any well completed in or drilling to the same horizon on the same
tract or farm, and no well shall be drilled nearer than 467 feet to any property
line, lease line, or subdivision line; provided the commission, in order to prevent
waste or to prevent the confiscation of property, may grant exceptions to permit
drilling within shorter distances than prescribed in this paragraph when the
commission shall determine that such exceptions are necessary either to prevent
waste or to prevent the confiscation of property.
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(a)(1) (West Supp. 1992-93).
179. Schlachter, 825 S.W.2d at 738-39.
180. 571 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1978).
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for less expense than he could drill and complete a new well to such forma-
tion with proper spacing.
The court of appeals disagreed with Schlachter's interpretation of the Ex-
xon case. 181 Recognizing that the term "waste" as used in Rule 37 has long
been defined as "the ultimate loss of oil, '182 the court noted that the deter-
minative issue for a Rule 37 exception based on waste prevention is whether
denial of the exception will result in the ultimate loss of minerals. 183 Ac-
cording to the court, the Exxon case merely held that economic circum-
stances could be considered in determining whether to grant an exception. 
184
Thus, under the Exxon case, the Commission may grant a Rule 37 exception
with regard to the recompletion of an existing well if: (1) the existing well
bore will recover oil reserves that cannot be produced by any other existing
well; and (2) it is not economically feasible to drill at a regular location (even
though such new well would recover all of the reserves recoverable by the
existing well).185
Schlachter's situation was found to not satisfy either condition. 186 In this
connection, there was substantial evidence before the court that: (1) existing
wells were capable of recovering the remaining reserves in the Pettit forma-
tion; and (2) it would be economically feasible for Schlachter to drill a new
well at a regular location, since the value of recoverable reserves attributable
to a new well would exceed the associated costs by more than $1 million. 18 7
The court therefore found that the Commission did not misinterpret or mis-
apply the controlling legal principles and that the Commission's actions
were reasonably supported by substantial evidence. 188
B. NEW GAS PRORATIONING RULES
In April 1992, the Texas Railroad Commission substantially revamped
the gas prorationing rules in Texas. 189 The stated goals of the amendments
to Rules 30,190 31,191 34,192 and 49193 were "simplification of the present
system by removal of complex mechanisms involving alphabet allowables,
increased protection of correlative rights in a changing marketplace, more
accurate determination of lawful market demand and a more accurate deter-
181. Schlachter, 825 S.W.2d at 740.
182. Id. (citing Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 134 Tex. 59, 70, 131 S.W.2d 73, 80
(1939)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 740-41.




189. See 17 Tex. Reg. 3236 (1992) (to be codified at 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.30, .31,
.34, .49) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n).
190. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.30 (West 1988) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n, Gas Nominations
Required. Rule 30).
191. Id. § 3.31 (Gas Well Allowables. Rule 31).
192. Id. § 3.34 (Gas to be Produced and Purchased Ratably).
193. Id. § 3.49 (Gas-Oil Ratio).
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mination of well capability."'' 94
With regard to determination of market demand, the new rules no longer
rely on purchaser nominations.1 95 The market demand forecast is now
based on actual prior production, subject to certain adjustments. The start-
ing point for the Commission's market demand forecast is actual production
of each well for the same month of the preceding year. 196 If circumstances
have changed since that time, the producer may file an "optional operator
forecast."' 197 However, the Commission may reject or modify an operator's
optional forecast if it is consistently inaccurate or it is being used to manipu-
late gas allocation.198 The forecasts are then subject to: (1) a capability ad-
justment, to insure that the forecasts do not exceed the total capability of the
operator's wells; (2) a reservoir forecast correction adjustment, to keep the
total reservoir market demand forecast in balance with production; (3) a
supplemental change adjustment, which is ministerial in nature to cover
such contingencies as a change of well or well test status during a prior
month, or a new final order requiring modification of field or well produc-
tion status; and (4) a Commission adjustment, which gives the Commission
discretion to adjust the forecasts if it believes the mathematical totals incor-
rectly reflect market demand.' 99
Under the new rules, allowables are replaced by well capability, which is
determined as the lesser of the G-10 deliverability or the highest monthly
production during the last six months.2° ° However, an operator may submit
a "substitute capability determination" based on a registered professional
engineer's analysis or on an independent tester's well test.20 ' This enhanced
capability determination routine replaces the "U," "L," "0" and "Regular"
allowables. 20 2 Recognizing that this capability determination is more strin-
gent than that under the former rules, the Commission now authorizes wells
limited by capability to accumulate underage. 20 3 The new rules also affect
allowables for wells in one-well fields, wells in non-prorated fields, special
allowable wells, and section 3.49(b) gas wells. 2° 4 Changes in this regard,
together with additional changes under the new rules, are intended to make
the "Immediate" allowables unnecessary. 20 5
194. 17 Tex. Reg. 3236, 3237 (1992) (Tex. R.R. Comm'n).
195. The prior rules used purchaser nominations as the starting point for the Commission's
assessment of market demand. However, as the Commission noted, "Commission records
show that purchaser nominations frequently substantially exceed production. Many purchas-
ers do not even participate in the nominations process." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.










IV. ISSUES INVOLVING JOINT OPERATIONS
A. DTPA CLAIMS
In Taylor v. GWR Operating CO. 2 0 6 the court of appeals held that the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) 20 7 has no application to disputes
between an operator and non-operator, 20 8 and further held that an issue of
fact existed concerning whether a fiduciary relationship existed between
them.2° 9 Taylor, as non-operator, and L & B Oil Company, as operator,
entered into three separate joint operating agreements in 1984 and 1985.
GWR succeeded L & B as operator. GWR brought suit against Taylor after
he refused to pay his share of operating expenses. Taylor counterclaimed,
asserting, among other things, violation of the DTPA and breach of con-
tract. GWR filed a motion for partial summary judgment with regard to
Taylor's counterclaim based on claims that: (1) Taylor had no cause of ac-
tion under the DTPA because he was not a consumer; and (2) GWR did not
owe a fiduciary duty to Taylor. The trial court granted the motion and sev-
ered the counterclaim from the original suit.2 10 Taylor appealed the partial
summary judgment.
On appeal, the court first examined whether a non-operating interest
owner under a joint operating agreement is a "consumer" under the
DTPA.21 1 In this regard, the court found that the decisions in C & C Part-
ners v. Sun Exploration & Production Co.212 and Hamilton v. Texas Oil &
Gas Corp.21 3 to be dispositive. 214 On the basis of such cases, the court held
that, when the operator merely incurs debts for the non-operators, as a mat-
ter of law, the non-operator is not a consumer of services within the defini-
tion of the DTPA.21 5
The court then addressed Taylor's contention that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment as to its cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.216 Taylor emphasized the fact that GWR in its petition had a claim
against Taylor for breach of fiduciary duty and that GWR asserted in its
petition that the joint operating agreements between the parties contem-
206. 820 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
207. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.854 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
208. Taylor, 820 S.W.2d at 910.
209. Id. at 912.
210. Id. at 909.
211. The DTPA defines "consumer" as follows:
"Consumer" means an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a sub-
division or agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any
goods or services, except that the term does not include a business consumer
that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corpo-
ration or entity with assets of $25 million or more.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4). The DTPA defines "services" so as to include
"work, labor, or service . . . furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods." Id.
§ 17.45(2).
212. 783 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
213. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Taylor, 820 S.W.2d at 910.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 911.
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plated a fiduciary relationship. Taylor claimed that GWR's allegations in
this regard either constituted judicial admissions that GWR could not dis-
prove in its motion for summary judgment or at least created a fact issue.
GWR, on the other hand, contended that the decision in Hamilton estab-
lished, as a matter of law, that there was no fiduciary relationship between
an operator and non-operator. The appellate court, however, concluded that
although the existence of a fiduciary duty ultimately is a question of law for
the court, circumstances giving rise to a fiduciary duty are questions of
fact.217 Noting that GWR pleaded the existence of a fiduciary relationship
with Taylor in its petition and that GWR did not present summary judg-
ment evidence to the contrary, the court held that there was a fact question
which precluded summary judgment, reversed the decision of the trial court,
and remanded the case for trial. 2 18
B. ORAL AMI AGREEMENT
In Crowder v. Tri-C Resources, Inc. 219 the court of appeals affirmed a sum-
mary judgment order declaring an alleged oral area of mutual interest
(AMI) agreement 220  unenforceable. 221  In November 1985, plaintiff
Crowder entered into an oil and gas exploration and development agreement
(the Cordele Agreement) and a joint operating agreement with Tri-C, in
which Crowder agreed to participate in Tri-C's exploration and development
of the Cordele Field. Neither agreement contained an AMI provision.
Crowder, however, claimed the existence of an oral AMI agreement with
Tri-C, under which Tri-C promised him the opportunity to participate in
any interest acquired by Tri-C within a certain area surrounding the Cordele
Field. Crowder claimed that the oral AMI agreement was evidenced by: a
plat of the Cordele Field prepared by Tri-C's land manager after execution
of the Cordele Agreement which showed an area outlined in red identified as
the "area of mutual interest boundary;" deposition testimony by Tri-C's
land manager confirming the existence of the AMI; and a letter dated Sep-
tember 16, 1986, in which Tri-C advised Crowder that it had "acquired by
farmout an additional 320 acres within our area of mutual interest of the
[Cordele Field]. '222
In May 1988, Tri-C and Crowder conveyed all of their respective interests
in the Cordele Field to a third party. Several months later, Tri-C acquired
an interest in the same general area as the land covered by the Cordele
217. Id.
218. Id. at 912.
219. 821 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
220. An area of mutual interest agreement is:
An agreement between or among parties to a farm-out agreement ... or other
agreement by which the parties attempt to describe a geographical area within
which they agree to share certain additional leases acquired by any of them in
the future.
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 63 (8th
ed. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
221. Crowder, 821 S.W.2d at 397, 400.
222. Id. at 395.
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Agreement, but did not offer Crowder a chance to participate in this acquisi-
tion. Crowder brought suit claiming that under the oral AMI agreement, he
had the right to acquire an interest in Tri-C's new acquisition. Tri-C as-
serted the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds223 and moved for sum-
mary judgment on that basis. Tri-C's motion also contended that any AMI
agreement between the parties terminated prior to the later acquisition when
Tri-C and Crowder conveyed their interest in the Cordele Field to a third
party. The trial court granted Tri-C's motion. 224
On appeal, Crowder conceded that an oral AMI agreement is subject to
the statute of frauds but asserted that his AMI agreement was enforceable
because there was a sufficient writing to satisfy the statute, relying on the
plat and the September 16, 1986 letter. The court of appeals, however, dis-
agreed, holding that the AMI agreement asserted by Crowder did not com-
ply with the statute's requirements. 225 The court noted that the statute
requires that an AMI agreement (or memorandum of it), containing a de-
scription of the property affected, be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged 226 and further requires that if the memorandum of agreement con-
sists of two documents, the second document must refer to the first. 227 In
this case, the court held that the plat did not satisfy the statute because it
was not signed by a representative of Tri-C,2 28 and the letter did not satisfy
the statute because it did not contain a sufficient description of the prop-
erty.229 The court further held that the two documents together did not
satisfy the statute either because neither the plat nor the letter referenced the
other document. 230
Crowder contended that Tri-C was equitably and judicially estopped from
denying the existence of the AMI agreement. With regard to the matter of
equitable estoppel, the court held that Crowder could not use the doctrine
offensively to establish a cause of action for breach of the AMI agreement. 2 31
As to judicial estoppel, the court held that such doctrine applied only when a
party in a prior proceeding stated under oath in its pleadings the contrary of
the assertion sought to be made.232 Crowder's judicial estoppel argument
was based on Tri-C's land manager's deposition testimony admitting the
existence of the AMI agreement. Because the land manager's deposition tes-
timony had been given in the same proceeding and not in a prior proceeding,
the doctrine of judicial estoppel was held to be not applicable. 233
223. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
224. Crowder, 821 S.W.2d at 395.
225. Id. at 397.










C. MODIFICATION OF OPERATING AGREEMENT
Hondo Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude Operator, Inc. 234 presented a dispute
between an operator and non-operator regarding overhead charges made
pursuant to a joint operating agreement. In 1962 and 1965, Texas Crude
Operator, Inc., as operator, and Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), as
non-operator, entered into three separate operating agreements with regard
to mineral properties. Amoco Production Company also participated in the
operating agreements as non-operator. Originally, the operating agreements
contained a PASO-T-1955-2 Accounting Procedure standard form, which
provided for a certain method for an operator to allocate overhead expenses
to non-operators. 235 Texas Crude initially charged ARCO and Amoco over-
head expenses based on the PASO method. In April 1978, however, Texas
Crude began calculating overhead charges based on an accounting method
recognized by the Council of Petroleum Accounting Societies ("CO-
PAS").236 The effect of this change caused the monthly overhead charges to
the non-operators to rise from approximately $175 per well to over $530 per
well. Although Texas Crude did not expressly notify the non-operators of
this change from PASO to COPAS methods, the evidence at trial indicated
that ARCO was aware of the change.237 ARCO paid the higher overhead
charges without incident for the next six years. Amoco also noticed the
change, but it refused to pay the higher rate. In order to avoid dispute,
Texas Crude agreed to charge overhead to Amoco at a lower rate.
In 1984, ARCO learned of Amoco's favorable arrangement with Texas
Crude regarding overhead, and it attempted to negotiate with Texas Crude
for a similar lower rate, without success. ARCO then unilaterally began
withholding amounts from its overhead payments to Texas Crude, in order
to recover what it considered overcharges. The amount of alleged
overcharges was $170,755.03, which was the difference between the amounts
of overhead charged ARCO and Amoco. Texas Crude responded by with-
holding payments to ARCO with regard to other properties in which ARCO
was operator and Texas Crude was non-operator.
In the meantime, ARCO sold its interest in the properties involved in the
234. 970 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1992).
235. The PASO method "provides for a fixed rate per well plus a portion of a camp and
district expenses allocated on a per well basis among the wells in the district." Id. at 1436.
236. The COPAS method "establishes for overhead a fixed sum per well, known as the
combined fixed rate ('CFR'), and adjusts the CFR annually on April 1 of each year based upon
a referenced cost index." Id.
237. The appellate court explained:
An expert at trial ... testified that ARCO knew about the switch. Texas Crude
began using COPAS on April 1, 1978. April 1 is also the date on which COPAS
CFRs are annually escalated. Operators and non-operators, therefore, observe
April statements with some care. An ARCO accountant further testified that
ARCO codes its bills when it receives them, and it uses a different code for
COPAS and PASO. ARCO routinely computerizes these codes and tracks
them in reports to management. Moreover, in October 1978, a member of





lawsuit to Hondo Oil & Gas Company, effective January 1, 1987. ARCO
did not advise Hondo of the dispute, and Hondo did not otherwise learn of
the dispute prior to the sale. Following the sale, Texas Crude sought to
recover for ARCO's underpayment of overhead charges by retaining
Hondo's share of the proceeds pursuant to a claimed operator's lien. By
August 1987, Texas Crude had suspended sufficient sums to offset the money
retained by ARCO.
Thereafter, Hondo sued Texas Crude for breach of the operating agree-
ment, and Texas Crude filed a third-party complaint against ARCO. The
trial court determined that ARCO had breached the operating agreement, as
modified, by withholding payments to Texas Crude but limited the damages
awarded Texas Crude to $117,539.97 due to the statute of limitations. 238
The trial court also concluded that Texas Crude breached the operating
agreement by withholding revenues due to Hondo and awarded Hondo dam-
ages of $170,755.03 plus attorneys' fees. 239 All parties appealed.
On appeal, ARCO contended that the operating agreement had not been
modified so as to provide for COPAS accounting procedures because Texas
Crude acted unilaterally without ARCO's consent. The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed, noting that under Texas law240 parties may modify a contract by
their acts and conduct. 24 1 In this instance, although Texas Crude did
change accounting procedures unilaterally, the court determined that
ARCO was aware of the change and by its conduct consented to it.242 For
example, the court noted that following Texas Crude's change to COPAS
charges, ARCO's own computerized accounting codes were changed to re-
flect COPAS accounting methods.24 3 In addition, the court emphasized that
after becoming aware that Texas Crude was charging overhead under the
COPAS schedule, ARCO's management complained to Texas Crude about
the change with regard to a different property not involved in the lawsuit but
made no complaint about similar charges made against its interest in these
properties.244 The lack of a complaint coupled with ARCO's knowledge of
the charges implied consent according to the court. 245 Most importantly for
the court, however, was the fact that ARCO paid the overhead charges with-
out complaint for six years.246 On this basis, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's conclusion regarding contract modification. 24 7
ARCO next claimed that any modification, based on conduct, of the oper-
238. Id. at 1437.
239. Id.
240. See Bank of El Paso v. T. 0. Stanley Boot Co., 809 S.W.2d 279, 284 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1991), modified on other grounds, No. D-1272, 1992 WL 353291 (Tex. Dec. 2, 1992); Mid
Plains Reeves, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989,
writ denied); Emmer v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 668 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1984, no writ).
241. Hondo Oil & Gas Co., 970 F.2d at 1437.
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ating agreement violated the Texas statute of frauds.248 The appellate court
again disagreed with ARCO's position, reasoning that a contract modifica-
tion does not violate the statute of frauds if the portion of the contract being
modified was not required by the statute to be in writing.249 Because the
operating agreement could conceivably have been performed within one
year, the court concluded that the agreement need not be in writing, and
likewise, the modification did not violate the statute of frauds.250
ARCO next complained that an operator has no right to charge different
rates to non-operators in the same well who signed the same operating agree-
ment, citing the provision in the operating agreement that states that the
parties will be charged their proportionate share of costs and expenses. The
court found no wrongdoing on the part of Texas Crude in this regard, 251
noting that the evidence at trial established that it was not uncommon for an
operator to charge different rates to different non-operators in the same well
because such rates are the product of negotiation. 252 There being no evi-
dence that Texas Crude had charged ARCO a rate higher than ARCO's
proportionate share, the court concluded that the mere fact that Texas
Crude had decided to charge Amoco less than Amoco's proportionate share,
did not require Texas Crude to take a similar loss with regard to ARCO. 253
As the basis for claiming entitlement to interest on the sums awarded it by
the trial court, Hondo argued on appeal that Texas Crude's withholding of
payments violated the Texas Natural Resource Code. 254 The trial court held
that Texas Crude did not violate the Code without explaining the basis for
its holding. 255 Presumably the trial court concluded that Texas Crude had a
reasonable doubt as to whether Hondo was entitled to the proceeds. The
Fifth Circuit affirmed this result, refusing to find any violation of the Code
that would have allowed Hondo to recover prejudgment interest. 256
Texas Crude contended on appeal that the trial court erred in determining
that Texas Crude breached the operating agreement by withholding pro-
ceeds owed to Hondo. The trial court's determination of breach by Texas
Crude was based on findings that ARCO was primarily liable for the liabili-
ties at issue. 257 The evidence which supported this conclusion was that after
ARCO's assignment of the properties to Hondo, Texas Crude continued to
demand payment of the disputed operating charges from ARCO alone; sub-
sequent billings from Texas Crude for the post-assignment period did not
248. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1987).
249. 970 F.2d at 1438.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1439.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Section 91.403 of the Code (as it existed prior to the 1991 amendment) required that
interest be paid for late revenue payments, unless there is "a reasonable doubt that the payee
does not have clear title to the interest in the proceeds of production." TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 91.403(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (amended 1991).
255. 970 F.2d at 1439.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1440.
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indicate that Hondo was being held accountable for ARCO's failure to pay;
and Texas Crude specifically informed Hondo that it would pay Hondo its
revenues from the sale of production from the properties at issue so long as
Hondo continued to pay its share of the operating expenses. 258 Based on
this evidence, the Fifth Circuit applied the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, which
"precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right incon-
sistent with a position previously taken by him."' 259 Applying this rule to
the facts presented, the court held that Texas Crude acted improperly in
withholding Hondo's share of revenues attributable to the sale of production
from the properties at issue.260 The appellate court therefore affirmed the
trial court's judgment, but modified the amount of damages awarded to
Texas Crude against ARCO to $170,755.03.261 It also affirmed the trial
court's award of $69,072.25 in attorneys' fees to Hondo and refused to com-
pel ARCO to indemnify Texas Crude for such fees. 26 2
V. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. STATUTORY MINERAL LIEN
In Bandera Drilling Co., v. Lavino263 the court of appeals held that a drill-
ing contractor occupied the status of a "mineral contractor" 2M under the
statutory mineral lien 265 as to nonoperating working interest owners.2 66 In
October 1985, Computech Energy & Exploration was the operator and sole
working interest owner of a particular oil, gas, and mineral lease. It con-
tracted with Bandera Drilling Company, a drilling contractor, for the drill-
ing of two wells on the lease. In October and November 1985, the two wells
were drilled and completed. Thereafter, in January 1986, Computech made
various assignments of working interest to the appellees. Computech failed
to pay Bandera for the drilling costs, and in March 1986 Bandera filed a lien
affidavit in the county records as to Computech's interest in the lease. The
other working interest owners who received assignments in January were not
named in the affidavit and were not sent notice of the lien filing. Subse-
quently, Bandera brought suit against Computech and the other working
interest owners to foreclose its lien.
Section 56.002 of the Texas Property Code provides a lien in favor of min-




261. Id. at 1440-41.
262. Id. at 1441.
263. 824 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1992, n.w.h.).
264. "'Mineral contractor' means a person who performs labor or furnishes or hauls mate-
rial, machinery, or supplies used in mineral activities under an express or implied contract
with a mineral property owner or with a trustee, agent, or receiver of a mineral property
owner." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.001(2) (Vernon 1984).
265. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.002 (Vernon 1984).
266. 824 S.W.2d at 784.
267. " 'Mineral subcontractor' means a person who:
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an express or implied contract with a mineral property owner. 268 The stat-
ute requires that a mineral subcontractor provide notice of the lien to the
property owners as a condition to perfection of the lien. 269 No such notice,
however, is required of mineral contractors. 2 70 In this instance, the non-
operators claimed that as to them Bandera was a mineral subcontractor who
had performed services for a contractor, Computech, and that Bandera's
failure to provide notice to them of the lien rendered the lien unenforceable.
The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the nonoperating
working interest owners. 27 1 The court of appeals reversed and remanded.
272
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeals focused upon the defini-
tion of a mineral contractor under section 56.001(2) as one who performs
labor or hauls material, machinery, or supplies under an express or implied
contract with a mineral property owner or with an agent of a mineral prop-
erty owner. 273 The appellate court found that Bandera performed labor
used in mineral activities274 under an express contract with Computech and
that Computech was a mineral property owner. 275 The court further found
that Computech was an agent for the appellees, who also were mineral prop-
erty owners. 276 Therefore, by definition, Bandera was a mineral contractor
and not subject to the notice requirements at issue. 27 7 In rejecting the appel-
lees' argument that Bandera was a mineral subcontractor, the court stated
that the mere existence of an additional party, like Computech, between the
laborer and some of the mineral property owners did not make Bandera a
mineral subcontractor with respect to the appellees. 278 Having concluded
that Bandera was a mineral contractor and therefore not required by the lien
statute to give any notice to the appellees,2 79 the court remanded the case for
further proceedings. 280
(A) furnishes or hauls material, machinery, or supplies used in mineral activi-
ties under contract with a mineral contractor or with a subcontractor;
(B) performs labor used in mineral activities under contract with a mineral con-
tractor; or
(C) performs labor used in mineral activities as an artisan or day laborer em-
ployed by a subcontractor."
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.001(4) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1993).
268. " 'Mineral property owner' means an owner of land, an oil, gas, or other mineral
leasehold, an oil or gas pipeline, or an oil or gas pipeline right-of-way." Id. § 56.001(3).
269. Id. § 56.021(b).
270. Id. § 56.021(a).
271. 824 S.W.2d at 783.
272. Id. at 782, 785.
273. Id. at 783.
274. " 'Mineral activities' means digging, drilling, torpedoing, operating, completing,
maintaining, or repairing an oil, gas, or water well, an oil or gas pipeline, or a mine or quarry."
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.001(1) (Vernon 1984).
275. 824 S.W.2d at 783-84.
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B. ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Mexia Oil & Gas, Inc. 281 the court of appeals held
that a purchaser of a producing property who acquired its interest "subject
to" a certain gas purchase contract did not assume an express obligation
contained in the contract which required the seller of the gas to indemnify
the buyer for severance tax payments made by the buyer for the seller's ac-
count. 2 82 In October 1981, Lone Star, as purchaser, and Reita Production,
Inc., as seller, entered into a gas purchase contract with regard to production
from a certain well. According to the gas purchase contract: (1) Reita would
pay all state severance taxes with regard to the gas delivered under the con-
tract; (2) Lone Star would then reimburse Reita for all severance taxes; and
(3) Reita would indemnify and hold Lone Star harmless with regard to pay-
ment of such taxes. In early 1982, Reita requested that Lone Star pay the
severance taxes directly to the state rather than going through the two-step
payment and reimbursement scheme under the contract. Lone Star agreed
to the new arrangement, and new division orders were signed providing that
Lone Star would make payments under the gas purchase contract for 100%
of production less gross production taxes. The new division order was effec-
tive April 1, 1982. Lone Star's letter which transmitted the new division
order to Reita pointed out that Reita was still responsible for severance taxes
on prior production.
Later Mexia acquired Reita's interest in the property covered by the gas
purchase contract with Lone Star, such acquisition being effective September
1, 1982. The assignment to Mexia provided that it was made "subject to"
the gas purchase contract. Further, Mexia signed a division order, effective
October 1, 1982, which provided that the gas purchase contract "insofar as
applicable" controlled the purchase and sale of gas between Mexia and Lone
Star.
Several years later, the State of Texas notified Lone Star that Reita had
failed to pay severance taxes due on production for January, February, and
March 1982. Lone Star paid the State $20,431.86 representing the taxes
owed plus applicable accrued interest and then attempted to recoup that sum
from Mexia. Mexia billed all owners of interest in the lease for their pro rata
share of the taxes and interest, collecting $10,215.93, and paid that amount
to Lone Star. Lone Star then sued Reita and Mexia seeking reimbursement
of the remainder under the terms of the gas contract. Reita was never served
with process. As to Lone Star's claims against Mexia, the trial court granted
a take nothing judgment. 283
Lone Star appealed, first claiming that by the terms of the written assign-
ment from Reita, Mexia had expressly assumed Reita's contractual obliga-
tion to indemnify Lone Star for severance tax payments. The court,
however, disagreed. 28 4 According to the court, in order for an assignee to be
281. 833 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
282. Id. at 200.
283. Id. at 201.
284. Id. at 202.
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liable for such a debt, the assignment must contain express promissory
words or words of "assumption," 28 5 and Mexia's acceptance of the assign-
ment, which simply stated that it was made "subject to" the gas contract,
did not expressly obligate Mexia to pay the prior debt of Reita.28 6 In the
absence of express language of assumption, the court found that the assign-
ment to Mexia did not impose an obligation on Mexia to indemnify Lone
Star for the severance taxes at issue. 28 7 The court also found that the Mexia
division order further demonstrated that Mexia had not assume an obliga-
tion to reimburse Lone Star for the severance tax payments. 28 8 In this con-
nection, the court noted that the division order provided that the gas
contract as amended would apply "in so far as applicable" with regard to gas
sales from Mexia to Lone Star. 28 9 The court reasoned that the Reita division
order had amended the gas contract so as to provide for payment of sever-
ance taxes by Lone Star.290 By this amendment, the court determined that
the contract had been changed so that it no longer required the seller to pay
severance taxes and the buyer to reimburse the seller for those payments.291
Instead, the buyer (Lone Star) would thereafter make the tax payments and
simply deduct the amount of those payments from distributions to the seller.
The court found no evidence that this amendment was ever altered by the
parties. 292 Thus, the court concluded that when Mexia ratified the contract
by signing the division order, the indemnity obligation was no longer appli-
cable to the sale of gas between Mexia and Lone Star.293
Lone Star next contended that Mexia assumed the indemnification obliga-
tion by implication, arguing that the obligation was a covenant running with
the land. Again, the court disagreed. 294 In this regard, the court reasoned
that privity of estate is essential to an assignee's liability on a covenant that
runs with the land and that as a result an assignee is not liable for breaches
of such covenants that occur before the assignment to him.295 Here, the
failure to pay taxes occurred prior to the assignment to Mexia, a time when
there was no privity of estate between Mexia and Lone Star. Accordingly,
the court held that Mexia was not liable to indemnify Lone Star for Reita's
breach of the indemnity obligation under this theory.
296
Finally, Lone Star contended that Mexia assumed the indemnification ob-
ligation under the contract pursuant to the doctrine of cum onere, which
states that one must accept the burdens along with the benefits imposed
under a contract. In this case, Lone Star claimed that because Mexia ac-
285. Id. at 201.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 201-02.
289. Id. at 201.









cepted benefits under the contract, such as favorable pricing provisions and
the right to enforce take-or-pay provisions, it was therefore obligated to as-
sume the burdens under the contract including the burden of indemnifying
Lone Star for severance tax payments. The court recognized that an implied
assumption of the burdens of a contract may be found when the benefit ac-
cepted by the assignee is "so entwined with the burden that the assignee [is]
estopped from denying assumption," or when "the assignee would otherwise
be unjustly enriched. ' 29 7 However, the court reasoned that in this case
Mexia had not been unjustly enriched because it had received no benefit
from Lone Star arising from the severance tax payment. 298 In addition, the
court held that the benefits received by Mexia under the contract were not
entwined with the severance tax indemnity burden, but rather were merely
tangential to that burden. 299 Analogizing Lone Star's claim to one for equi-
table restitution by a payor demanding that an assignee return money al-
ready paid to the assignee's assignor on the grounds that the assignor failed
to perform the contract, the court reasoned that the equities in this case
favored Mexia because there was no evidence that Mexia had any knowledge
of Reita's failure to pay the severance tax at issue whereas Lone Star, on the
other hand, knew or should have known of Reita's failure in this regard. 3° °
Based on all the circumstances, the court concluded that Mexia had not
assumed the alleged indemnification obligation either expressly or by
implication. 30 1
C. UNSUCCESSFUL FRAC DAMAGES
Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co. 302 arose out of an unsuccessful
sand frac job 30 3 when the fracing equipment failed. Tex-Lee had drilled and
completed an 8,000 foot well in the Austin Chalk Formation, which is an
extremely tight formation containing intermittent fractures. The well,
known as the White 1, was designed to encounter a subsurface fault and




301. Id. at 200.
302. 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991), writ denied per curiam, 839 S.W.2d
797 (Tex. 1992).
303. The court provided the following description of a sand frac job:
This operation is designed to loosen or break up tight formations which contain
oil or gas, thus causing the formations to have more permeability and greater
production.
Fracing involves the injection of a mixture of liquid and sand into the produc-
ing formation under extremely high pressure by means of pressure pumps. Ini-
tially, a gel containing very fine sand in suspension is pumped into the casing
and is pressurized through perforations in the casing into the producing forma-
tion. The pressure forces the cracks open, and the fine sand fills and seals the
smaller cracks closed, so that the later injections will be concentrated on the
largest fractures. After this is done, increasingly heavier concentrations of a
much larger grade of sand is similarly injected into the rock strata. This sand
props the rock formations open so that oil and gas may return through the




fracture system; however, the well missed the intended target. Nevertheless,
the well produced a small amount of oil for two weeks following completion.
Tex-Lee then decided to sand frac the well in an effort to create artificial
fractures to connect the well bore to the natural fault and fracture system, as
a means of enhancing production.
Tex-Lee hired Geo Viking to perform the fracture services, specifying that
the propped frac length should be 1,000 feet,3° 4 and that two blenders (one
being a backup) would be required. 30 5 Geo Viking brought two blenders out
to the job site. Shortly after Geo Viking began the frac job the primary
blender broke down. Rather than using the backup blender, Geo Viking had
another blender delivered to the well site, and Geo Viking resumed opera-
tions, using the new blender. During a critical part of the process, this
blender also broke down. Geo Viking was unable to continue the job with
the backup blender because it was inoperative. Geo Viking's representatives
at the well admitted that the backup blender had failed the previous day and
that they knew it was not in working condition.
At the time of the equipment failure, the length of the fractures were ap-
proximately 2,500 feet, but the propped length was only about 600 feet. The
well never produced oil in paying quantities after the botched frac job and
was eventually plugged. Any attempt to refrac the well was considered to be
futile. Tex-Lee then drilled the White Number 1-A well, which was located
approximately 250 feet from the first well. This replacement well was also a
nonproducer, which was unsuccessfully fraced and eventually plugged as a
dry hole. Tex-Lee brought suit against Geo Viking claiming violation of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.30 6 Following a jury trial, the trial
court entered judgment for Tex-Lee consistent with the jury's findings. 30 7
Geo Viking appealed on a variety of grounds.
Geo Viking first contended that there was no evidence or insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's findings that Geo Viking's conduct caused dam-
ages to Tex-Lee. Geo Viking claimed that Tex-Lee failed to prove that the
White I could have commercially produced oil or gas. The appellate court
noted that a plaintiff must prove with reasonable certainty the damages
caused by the defendant's conduct, 308 and the court recognized the inherent
difficulty in proving damages resulting from an improperly completed
well.30 9 Although recovery cannot be based on "damages that are remote,
304. "Various engineering concepts may be applied to the different variables involved to
calculate the distance that the fracing gel and sand has proceeded away from the well." Id.
305. The court explained:
The blender mixes the sand with a gel-like semi-liquid which holds the sand in
suspension during the injection and forces the combination into the well under
extremely high pressure. The gel was chemically designed to break down into
liquid after about two hours, depositing the sand in the formation and "prop-
ping" the fracture system open.
Id.
306. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.854 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
307. 817 S.W.2d at 360.




contingent, speculative, or conjectural," the court noted that proof of dam-
ages may be provided by opinions and inferences. 310 For example, the court
stated that an expert witness who is properly qualified can provide opinion
testimony as to the probability of obtaining production and the extent of
such production from the land at issue. 3 11 According to the court, this type
of evidence satisfies the requirement that the damages be proven with rea-
sonable certainty. 3 12 In this case, an expert geologist testified that the initial
production characteristics of the well prior to fracing, the general reservoir
characteristics, and the history of the fourteen wells within a one-mile radius
of the White 1 well, indicating that the well would have been a good pro-
ducer upon successful completion of the frac job. The expert also used this
information to calculate recoverable reserves attributable to that well, which
the appellate court found to be sufficient evidence. 3 13
Geo Viking argued that the dry hole drilled within 250 feet of the White 1
well indicated that the well was a dry hole and that Tex-Lee therefore suf-
fered no damages as a result of the unfinished frac job. The court dismissed
this argument, noting that there was evidence that the uncompleted frac job
damaged the fracture system in the vicinity of the White 1-A, thereby doom-
ing any chance of success for the replacement well. 3 14
Geo Viking next contended that the trial court erred in submitting jury
questions regarding whether Geo-Viking breached the implied warranty of
merchantability by providing an inoperative backup blender. The court of
appeals studied the evidence in the record and determined that: (1) the
agreement between the parties required that two blenders would be on loca-
tion for the frac job; (2) at no time were there two working blenders on site;
(3) Geo Viking knew at the time that the backup blender was broken, and
Tex-Lee was unaware of this; and (4) industry custom required two blenders
because of the possibility of one blender breaking down and causing the
same type of problem involved in this lawsuit. 31 5 Accordingly, the court
held that the jury question regarding whether the backup blender was not fit
for the ordinary purpose for which it was intended was properly submit-
ted 3 16 and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings. 3 7
Geo Viking likewise challenged the trial court's submission of the jury
question regarding whether Geo Viking failed to frac the well in a good and
workmanlike manner. Again turning to the evidence, the court of appeals
found testimony by Tex-Lee's expert witness and by a witness called by Geo
Viking to the effect that intentionally providing a nonworking backup
blender was irresponsible and could not be considered as "good and work-
310. Id. at 360.









manlike. ' 318 The court therefore held that the jury issues on that topic were
properly submitted and that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury's findings. 319
Geo Viking next asserted that the trial court erred in refusing a requested
instruction with regard to the damage issue. The White 1 well was situated
on an eighty-acre unit, but the frac job was designed to extend the fractures
beyond the unit boundaries. Geo Viking requested the trial court to instruct
the jury that, in calculating damages, the jury could consider only the
reserves that could have been recovered from lands within the unit bounda-
ries. Geo Viking argued that Tex-Lee could not recover damages for lost
production when it had no legal right to produce the oil in the first place.
The court of appeals rejected this argument with little discussion, holding
that it was contrary to the well-established rule of capture. 320 With slight
modification regarding the calculation of postjudgment interest, the appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's judgment.321
On motion for rehearing, the justice who authored the original opinion
changed his position regarding Geo Viking's requested damage instruction
and filed a dissenting opinion. 322 This dissent noted that the rule of capture
does not authorize a trespass, and that fracing under the land of another
would constitute a trespass.323 The dissent therefore reasoned that Tex-Lee
could not recover damages for the loss of oil and gas to which it was not
legally entitled.324 As a result, the dissent would hold that the trial court's
failure to submit Geo Viking's requested instruction constituted reversible
error. 325 The Texas Supreme Court's per curiam opinion denying Geo Vi-
king's application for writ of error stated that the denial should not be inter-
preted as approval or disapproval of the court of appeals' opinions regarding
"the rule of capture or trespass as they apply to hydraulic fracturing. '326
318. Id. at 363.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 364. The court explained:
[The] rule [of capture] permits the owner of a tract to drill as many wells on his
land as the Railroad Commission will allow and provides that he is not liable to
adjacent land owners whose lands are drained as a result of his operations. The





323. Id. at 365.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 366.
326. 839 S.W.2d at 797.
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